Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Bilancia v. Bemis : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lamar J. Winward; Attorney for Respondent.
Michael D. Hughes; Stephen D. Foote; HUghes & Bursell; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Bilancia v. Bemis, No. 20010364 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3276

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

€

^

li"

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE MARIE BILANCIA, fka,
SUZANNE MARIE BILANCIA BEMIS,
Appellate No. 20010364-CA
Petitioner/Appellant,
Argument Priority No. 15
v.

District Court 994500457 DA

CHRIS THOMAS BEMIS,
Respondent/Appellee.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment and Orders of the District Court
of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Utah
the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Presiding.

Lamar J. Winward (Bar No.)
150 North 200 East, # 204
St. George, UT 84770
Attorney for Respondent and
Appellee

Michael D. Hughes(Bar No. 1572;
Stephen D. Foote (Bar No. 89451
HUGHES & BURSELL
187 North 100 West
St. George, UT 84770
Attorneys for Petitioner and
Appellant

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

FE3 2 0 2002
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Pauteiie Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE MARIE BILANCIA, fka,
SUZANNE MARIE BILANCIA BEMIS,
Appellate No. 20010364-CA
Petitioner/Appellant,
Argument Priority No. 15
v.

District Court 994500457 DA

CHRIS THOMAS BEMIS,
Respondent/Appellee.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment and Orders of the District Court
of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Utah
the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Presiding.

Lamar J. Winward (Bar No.)
150 North 200 East, # 204
St. George, UT 84770
Attorney for Respondent and
Appellee

Michael D. Hughes(Bar No. 1572;
Stephen D. Foote (Bar No. 8945;
HUGHES & BURSELL
187 North 100 West
St. George, UT 84770
Attorneys for Petitioner and
Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES & STATUTES

i
ii
ii

ARGUMENT

1

ISSUE NO. 1: THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED ITEMS
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE FINAL DECREE

1

ISSUE NO. 2: RES JUDICATA APPLIES TO A MODIFICATION OF THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE

2

ISSUE NO. 3: THE TRIAL COURT DID VIOLATE BOTH U.C.A. 30-3-5
AND RULE 6-404 OF THE U.R.J.A

4

ISSUE NO. 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
WRONGLY APPLIED THE LAW TO TERMINATE THE APPELLANT'S
ALIMONY
CONCLUSION

5
6

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Dishinqer

v. Potter,

Grayson Roper Ltd.
Maoris
2000)

& Associates,

424 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 2001 UT App. 209... 5
v. Finlinson,
Inc.

782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 5

v. Neways,

Inc.,

16 P.2d 1214 (Utah
3

Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App.)

5

Saunders

5

Scharf

v. Sharp,

806 P.2d 198, (Utah 1991)

v. BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)

5

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5
Rule 6-404 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration

ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
1,4

ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1
The Lower Court Improperly Considered Items
Outside The Scope of The Final Decree
In the Appellee's brief, he states that the Divorce Decree in
this action is unique. This is true. The Appellee then goes on to
state that the trial court was simply entering a final order
concerning alimony as the first order was only a temporary order.
This is false.

The order, agreed to by the parties and entered by

the court in the original divorce action, was a final order.

The

only portion of the order that was subject to review after one year
was whether the alimony would continue or terminate.

This is

evidenced by the trial court's own language when the Judge stated
that
"the issue of continuing or terminating the alimony
provision is before the court properly in this motion.
But increasing requires a modification of the agreement
of the parties that led to the stipulated divorce decree.
And I think that brings into play on that particular
issue rule 6-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, which requires the filing of a petition
and service of a summons and the whole provision." (R.
128-129).
If the amount of alimony could not be changed pursuant to the
motion before the court, then it is obvious that this was not a
temporary order, but a final order.
The only part of the order that could change was the duration,
and the

Decree

stated

that the only

criterion

to determine

continuation or termination by motion would be the Appellant's
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disability status.

In other words, if Ms. Bilancia's disability

continued, then so would the alimony, but if her disability were
discontinued, then she would be eligible for work and alimony would
terminate.
While the trial court may have concluded that Mr. Bemis did
not have the ability to pay alimony, this matter is completely
irrelevant to the issues before the trial court.

As previously

stated, the only area of interest in the action was whether or not
the appellant's disability continued or not.

If it continued, as

the trial court found it did, then the alimony must be continued.
If the appellant's disability had not continued, then alimony would
have had to terminate. The appellant does not dispute the findings
of fact by the court, only the application of those findings to the
decree and the law.
terminate

The trial court based its decision to

the appellant's alimony on impermissible

facts and

therefore, the trial court's decision should be overturned and
Appellant should have her alimony award reinstated.

Issue No. 2
Res Judicata Applies to a Modification
of The Decree of Divorce
As pointed out above, the alimony award was a final order.
The only changeable portion of the order was the duration which
would only change after at least one year and depending solely on
the Appellant's disability status.
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It is painfully obvious that the Decree left only enough room
to continue or terminate alimony based solely on the Appellant's
continuing disability status.

Any other changes, as correctly

pointed out by the trial court, would have to be made pursuant to
a petition to modify the Decree.

Interestingly, there was no

petition to modify and there was no argument or evidence introduced
by the Appellee that reflected the intent of the parties in regard
to the meaning of paragraph 15 of the Decree of Divorce.
of this, the Maoris

& Associates,

Inc.

v.

Neways,

Inc.,

In light
16 P.2d

1214 (Utah 2000) decision, cited by the Appellee as supporting his
conclusion that this is not a final order, in fact supports the
Appellant's point of view that this is a final order.

In this

case, the order is final. The only issue for the court was whether
to continue or terminate alimony on certain grounds outlined in the
stipulation and Decree. As there was no reservation of the issue
of amount or any other factor, including ability to pay, the order
is in fact res judicata as to all items except those specifically
reserved as was the continuation or termination based solely on the
continuing status of the Appellant's disability.

Therefore, Res

Judicata does apply to the order including the Appellee's ability
to pay, and any deviation, except what was specifically authorized
by the decree, had to be done by modification.

As there was no

modification filed, and there was specifically found to be no
substantial or material change of circumstances, the trial court
overstepped

its

bounds

by

terminating

alimony
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based

on

the

Appellee's ability to pay.

Issue No. 3
The Trial Court Did Violate Both U.C.A. 30-3-5
And Rule 6-404 of The U.R.J.A.
As previously pointed out, the court did in fact violate the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5 and Rule 6-404 of
the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. The Appellee completely
misconstrues the Appellants arguments in regards to the necessity
of filing a modification action to come to the result the court
reached.

Appellee states that the "decree applies equally to both

parties, and the rules apply equally to both parties." This is in
fact what the Appellant has argued form the beginning.

Plainly

put, the decree states that alimony would continue or terminate
based on the Appellant's disability status.

Therefore, if the

disability continues, so does alimony, and if the disability ends,
so does alimony.

This is what was provided in the stipulation of

the parties and in the final decree of divorce.

For the court to

go beyond the decree and look into different areas and make
substantive changes to the decree without a petition to modify is
error, and the same is a violation of both U.C.A. 30-3-5 and Rule
6-404 of the U.R.J.A..
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Issue No. 4
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion And Wrongly Applied
The Law to Terminate The Appellant's Alimony
The final argument submitted by the Appellee, simply put, is
not well founded.

The Appellee's complete argument is simply that

for failure to marshal the evidence as required by Moon v.

Moon,

973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App.), the court should affirm the trial
court's order.

It is true that Moon requires a party who is

attempting to challenge the findings of fact of the trial court to
marshal the evidence in the manner presented by the Appellee's
argument.

However, the Appellee negates to mention that it is not

the finding of fact itself that is relevant here.

It is, in fact,

the application of those facts made by the trial court to the
Decree and the law which is most relevant.
It would be error to affirm the trial court's decision "based
on plaintiffs'

failure

unsupported." Saunders
also;

Dishinger

to

v.

v. Potter,

show

Sharp,

the

findings

of

fact

to be

806 P.2d 198, (Utah 1991); See

424 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 2001 UT App. 209.

In fact, the Supreme Court of Utah Stated that "[i]f the appellant
fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law in the case. Saunders,
See

also

Grayson

1989); Soharf

Roper

Ltd.

v. BMG Corp.,

v.

Finlinson,

806 P.2d at 199;

782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah

700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
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In this case, there were irrelevant findings of fact which
were incorrectly relied upon by the trial court in making its
decision. The application of the relevant findings of fact made by
the" trial court leaves only one possible decision, and that is to
continue alimony.

Conclusion
In the instant case, the lower court, absent subject matter
jurisdiction, has attempted to utilize equity to give rights back
to the Appellee which he voluntarily contracted away in his
stipulation and subsequent Decree of Divorce.
lower court has emaciated the principles of

In so doing, the
res judicata, and

circumvented even the parties' own stipulation.

The court's

decision is, thus, not only legally violative of the doctrine of
res judicata, but obviates the provisions of U.C.A. 30-3-5 and Rule
6-404 of the U.R.J.A..

Appellant, once again, requests that the

Appellate Court reverse the decision with specific instructions to
the lower court to reinstate alimony

pursuant to the Stipulation

and Decree previously entered.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 0

day of February, 2002.
HUGHES AND BURSELL, P.C.

1ICHAEL D. HUGHES
STEPHEN D. FOOTE
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I, Stephen D. Foote, certify that on February ^O,

2002, I

served two copies of the attached Appellant's Reply Brief upon
Lamar Winward, the counsel for the appellee in this matter, by hand
delivering the same to him at the following address:
Lamar Winward
150 North 200 East, # 204
St. George, UT 84770
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